Waste Prevention Committee, Manhattan Citizens' Solid Waste Advisory Board

Marjorie J. Clarke, Ph.D. -- 6/16/2000

Premise of the questions:

According to the NYS Solid Waste Management Act of 1988, the 2000 NYC Solid Waste Management Plan was supposed to present a 10-year schedule for implementing measures to manage and prevent solid waste, prioritizing waste prevention above all other methods, recycling and composting above all but waste prevention, and de-emphasizing disposal (and export) methods. The DEIS attached to the current Solid Waste Management Plan is supposed to evaluate the environmental, economic and social costs and benefits of the actual management Plan chosen by the Department of Sanitation, as well as alternatives to the Plan. Since the Plan has evaluated export of all currently non-recycled wastes and materials to landfill, but provided no new measures for waste prevention, the obvious alternative to the Solid Waste Management Plan would be one replete with milestones (scheduled Plan elements) to implement many waste prevention (as well as recycling and composting) incentives, legislation, and research and educational programs over the next ten year planning timeframe. The FEIS should compare the environmental benefits of waste prevention methods with the costs of long-distance transport and disposal.

The City’s decision to give waste prevention very low funding priority compared with all other waste management methods is not well founded when one considers the fact that waste prevention will, for a relatively small investment, avoid larger expenditures on collection and export. As tons of waste are prevented, collection trucks, personnel and eventually even garages, as well as processing and disposal facilities, can be stretched farther. Processing, treatment and disposal costs associated with the construction and operation of solid waste management facilities can also be reduced if the City moves aggressively to implement waste prevention. It makes little sense to export recyclable, repairable, reusable, remanufacturable, and preventable items (e.g., disposables, excessive packaging, toxics).

Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that waste prevention investments not only avoid collection and disposal costs in the first year in which they are implemented, but the savings from a single or short-term investment extend out into the future, more than making up for the initial investment. For example, once an office installs e-mail, the amount of paper used plummets, not only in the first year, but in all succeeding years. The expenditure on equipment occurs once; the savings recur year after year without much further expenditure. As another example, if an educational program spurs citizens to start buying items packaged in bulk, carry their own shopping bags, and stop buying so many disposable products, waste is prevented the first year, and this same waste stream will be prevented in all future years without further expenditure as long as the new behavior is maintained.

On page 7-11, Table 7.1.5-1 of the 1992 Solid Waste Management Plan, the City presented the following figures: the Potential for Waste Prevention (Year 2000) shows the tonnage and percent prevented for residential (250,000 tons, 7%), institutional (90,000 tons, 10%), and commercial (330,000 tons, 9%).  The overall rate of prevention is just over 8%.

There are great monetary savings and environmental impacts avoided by instituting waste prevention recommendations promised in 1992 SWM Plan: Quote from Pages 17.2-2 to 17.2-3:

The estimates that follow were calculated by DOS and based on assumptions documented in the 1992 Plan Appendix Volumes 3 and 7.1. In the year 2000, this [waste prevention] would amount to approximately 600,000 tons a year.  Based on calculations obtained by modeling the City's proposed waste-management system with and without these prevention programs in place, the "avoided costs" to the City's waste-management system due to these reductions are estimated to be in the range of $87 to $92 million in the year 2000, or $700 to $800 million cumulatively between 1992 and 2010 (in net-present-value terms).

On the collection side, a reduction of 600,000 tons a year would reduce collection costs by $26 to $29 million in the year 2000 (because the number of truckshifts would be reduced by 4 to 5%).  Vehicle miles traveled would be reduced by 1.6 million miles per year (using System B for illustrative purposes):  a 3% decrease, which would reduce vehicular air emissions by a comparable amount.

On the processing side, a reduction of 600,000 tons a year would reduce facility capital and operating costs by $58 to $60 million; require 750 million fewer gallons of water a year for rinsing recyclables (by generators) and 100 to 200 million fewer gallons of water in waste-processing facilities; reduce air emissions from recycling facilities by about 5%, from waste-to-energy facilities by 6% (System A) or 7% (System B), from landfills by 18 to 22% (A,B), and from ashfills by 6-7% (B,A); reduce facility acreage requirements by about 14 acres; demands on landfill capacity by about 15%, and ashfill capacity by about 8%.

The estimated cost of a partial prevention program (for backyard composting and public education) is $20 per ton in the year 2000, while the full avoided cost would be on the order of $140 per ton for System A and $150 per ton for System B.  As much as $120 to $130 per ton in prevention programs therefore could be added before costs would exceed benefits.  The effects of a more-effective-than-projected prevention program and of a less-effective-than-projected program are represented in Figure 17.2.1-1, which shows that prevention programs become increasingly cost-effective as prevented percentages increase.  The reason for this is that larger prevented tonnages allow relatively greater reductions in truck shifts and facility capacity; conversely, when reductions are smaller, fewer savings are captured through reduced collection and facility costs.

In addition to the obvious fact that waste prevented need not be collected, treated, and is not subject to disposal costs, there are further benefits. Savings begin in production (for example, reduced packaging) and continue through the markets to the consumer). New York City government itself is a huge consumer and could save many millions in purchasing as well as through DOS in reduced collection and disposal costs.

Waste prevention also carries with it the possibility of job creation. While some manufacturing and production jobs might be eliminated, service, repair and reconditioning jobs are increased. We have long promoted (with the support of DOS) the creation of repair / swap facilities in each Community board. Young people trained in vocational schools to recondition small appliances and furniture could eventually result in the increase in small businesses similar to these centers. Left over paint (a disposal problem) could be sold for small jobs to grateful handymen/women, and given away to nonprofits.

Job creation exists for many industries, including repair businesses, rental shops, thrift and other resale stores, cleaning establishments, spare parts manufacturing, and others. The types of jobs created can span the range of skill levels, including jobs in training, management, unskilled labor, and entrepreneur. The Council on the Environment has shown in its pilot projects the enormous savings that waste prevention has provided to the businesses and large institutions it studied. Such savings can be achieved by all businesses, institutions, as well as by City government offices and facilities. The implementation of Intro. 482 would, very quickly, produce enormous savings in purchasing and in collection and disposal costs, and in reduced consumption of supplies in City agencies.

Since one aspect of waste prevention, reuse, depends on businesses that promote product longevity, anything the City can do to encourage reuse will promote development of these industries. It is for these reasons that we argue strongly that investments in waste prevention must be increased. Initiatives in the areas of research, education, programs, measurement, legislation, and reporting, are of the highest priority.

1. Waste Prevention has proven itself to be by far the most cost-effective way of dealing with solid waste, because collection, processing and disposal costs are reduced or avoided altogether. The Department of Sanitation calculated that $90 million could be saved annually by implementing 9% waste prevention by 2000. Jobs would be created were the City to enhance the local reuse industries by investing in waste prevention.

1. This being the case, and since the 1988 NYS Solid Waste Management Act established that all local solid waste management plans be written to include sufficient milestones to achieve the goal of 8-10% waste prevention by 1997, what are the legal, environmental, social, and economic justifications (costs AND benefits) that the NYC 2000 Solid Waste Management Plan should not include sufficient milestones to achieve this amount of waste prevention in the ten-year planning timeframe?
2. Why is there no ten-year planning timeframe for waste prevention?
3. Why has the DEIS not evaluated waste prevention methods as alternatives to export for ANY percentage of the NYC "waste" stream that is now slated for export? The FEIS should evaluate the environmental, economic, and social impacts of source reduction and reuse of 10% and 20% of the "waste" stream that NYC plans to export in its draft Solid Waste Management Plan.

1. Recycling and composting, after waste prevention, are the most environmentally sound methods of solid waste management. Jobs would be created were the City to enhance and attract new businesses to NYC by investing in recycling and composting.

a. Since EPA's has issued a report recently that details numerous municipalities that have already achieved greater than 50% recycling and composting diversion rates, since the Independent Budget Office figures indicate that the per ton cost of recycling will soon be the same or less than export, and since the 1988 NYS Solid Waste Management Act established that all local solid waste management plans be written to include sufficient milestones to achieve the goal of 40-42% diversion for recycling by 1997, what are the legal, environmental, social, and economic justifications (costs AND benefits) that the NYC draft Solid Waste Management Plan does not include sufficient milestones to achieve this amount of recycling and composting in the 10-year planning timeframe?

b. Why is there no ten-year planning timeframe for recycling and composting?

c. Why has the DEIS not evaluated recycling and composting methods as alternatives to the proposed Export Project for ANY percentage of the NYC "waste" stream that is now slated for export? The FEIS should evaluate the environmental, economic, and social impacts of recycling and composting of 1997 figure of 40% and a proposed 2010 figure of 60% of the "waste" stream that NYC plans to export in its draft Solid Waste Management Plan.

 

Information and Reports

2. Why has the Department of Sanitation delayed and withheld many in-house and consultant-generated research reports? Several have been mentioned as being appendices to the Solid Waste Management Plan, and seem to be the source of conclusions presented in the Plan, but are not available. One of these, the Scientific Applications International Corporation's waste prevention report, has been promised to be delivered for well over a year and kept in draft form to prevent its dissemination. Until this report is available for review, there is no way to evaluate anything the City has accomplished or that it proposes for the future. No explanation has been offered to explain the delay, leading to suspicions that research results may be modified. The Solid Waste Management Plan should not be approved until the Original Results found by the waste prevention research consultants (as well as the multitude of final reports and studies mentioned below and in the attached list) are appended to the Plan, are disseminated to the public, and are thoroughly assimilated by the City Council, elected officials and the public.
3. Since all reports are generated on computers these days, why doesn't the City make these available to the Council and the public as soon as they are completed, via the NYC DOS internet site? The City has the capability to convert word-processed documents to html format, and surely has these reports on disk already. The public has paid for the reports; it has a right to see them as soon as they are presented to the Department.
4. The Independent Budget Office is now preparing analyses to show the economics of increasing the size of the recycling/composting and waste prevention programs in the City, relative to the size of the export program. Why has the City not included such an analysis in its SWMP or DEIS?

 

Follow-up on Earlier Waste Prevention / Recycling Planning Commitments by New York City;

Specific Questions regarding the Plan and DEIS

5. How much has the City spent on waste prevention program implementation in each year of the 1990s and FY2000 (broken down by Department)?
6. How much has the City spent on waste prevention education in each year of the 1990s and FY2000 (broken down by Department)?
7. How much has the City spent on developing waste prevention legislation and economic incentives in each year of the 1990s and FY2000 (broken down by Department)?
8. How much has the City spent specifically on recycling education in each year of the 1990s and FY2000 (broken down by Department, in-house and consultants)?
9. How much has the City spent specifically on recycling enforcement in each year of the 1990s and FY2000?
10. How much has the City spent specifically on composting education in each year of the 1990s and FY2000 (broken down by Department, in-house and consultants)?
11. How much has the City spent on composting program implementation in each year of the 1990s and FY2000 (broken down by Department)?
12. How much has the City spent on each of the following: waste prevention, recycling, and composting research in each year of the 1990s and FY2000?
13. How much waste (tons) has the City prevented as a result of its waste prevention programs in each year of the 1990s and FY2000 (disaggregated according to product and packaging categories, organics). The Plan mentions (pages 85-86) 2 reports that address this ("Evaluating New York City's Waste Prevention Programs" and "Waste Prevention Research Report on Programs in Other Jurisdictions"), but which are not included in the Plan. Tellus, one of the subcontractors to DOS for its current waste prevention research, has produced a study of waste prevention achieved for Massachusetts. On December 1, 1999 the National Recycling Coalition held a national information exchange on methodologies for measuring waste prevention, but even though the City was invited and expected to send a representative, none came. Why has the City passed up the opportunity to gain state-of-the-art information on this subject? No quantification is provided in the Plan for most of the City's waste prevention programs. Why is this so, if the City paid for a report to provide these data? Where are these reports, and why aren't they appended to the Plan? Why is there no environmental evaluation in the DEIS of waste prevention programs as an alternative way of handling tonnage that is proposed to be exported?
14. The City has stated that certain advances in waste prevention require legislative or regulatory action on a state and federal level (e.g., page 88 for packaging). How much has the City spent in each fiscal year in the 1990s and FY2000 on advocating improvements in waste prevention legislation, regulations, incentives, research or education on the state and federal levels?
15. The City committed to instituting a Reuse Hotline several years ago. It is still in the pilot stage. Why has it taken this long, and when exactly, will the rest of the City have access to this service? What percentage of Staten Islanders has been reached by the publicity materials prepared for this pilot? Was the hotline service designed to measure the quantity of waste reduced over time? How much waste prevention is the Hotline expected to produce in each of the 10 year planning timeframe? What are the expected environmental, economic, and social impacts?
16. Where is appendix 2.3-1, referred to on pages 80 and 85 of the Plan?
17. What are the City's environmental and economic justifications (costs AND benefits) for ignoring most of the waste prevention and recycling recommendations of the Borough-wide Solid Waste Management Planning Task Forces that issued reports in 1997, prepared at the behest of the City-State Fresh Kills Closure Task Force? (Note that on page 82, the City takes credit for fulfilling a recommendation of the "Task Force". Please present the analysis to support the decision to disregard these recommendations.
18. Has the City accomplished all the waste prevention, recycling and composting measures recommended in the City-State Fresh Kills Closure Task Force? If not, why? When will these be accomplished? Why are they not all in the Plan or in the DEIS?
19. The Plan mentions (page 89) that a report entitled, "Life Span Costing Analysis Case Studies" is forthcoming (though it is not stated when), and that methodologies were developed for incorporating product durability and waste management costs into purchasing specifications and contract awards. Since this information is critical for designing improved methods of environmental procurement by City agencies, and if implemented, would produce considerable environmental benefits due to waste prevention, why hasn't the City used the information from this study to create Plan elements to modify procurement to take advantage of this new knowledge in life span costing, and to evaluate the environmental and economic impacts of implementing this in City agencies? This report should be included as part of the Plan and FEIS.
20. The Plan also mentions more research findings and recommendations on waste prevention and recycled content procurement policies and practices (page 88) from "Procurement Policy Research Report". Where is this report, and why have the recommendations not been developed into an implementation program as part of the Plan or evaluated in the DEIS?
21. The Plan alludes (page 87) to a "NYCitySen$e Summary Report" and "NYCitySen$e Guide", which has recommendations for agency-specific waste prevention programs. Why aren't these in an appendix to the Plan, and why haven't the recommendations for agency waste prevention practices been adapted into milestones for the Plan for all City agencies?
22. The City has a Mayoral Directive, 96-2, that would, if implemented to its fullest, result in City agencies' reducing consumption of supplies, reducing purchase of disposables, and increasing repair and reuse of durable products. Since 1996, what programs has each agency implemented to comply with this directive, how much and what types of waste have been prevented in each year by each agency covered under the Directive, and how much has this cost to administer?
23. In discussing the implementation of the Mayoral Directive, difficulties in measuring outcomes is cited as a reason for not providing detailed information on the results of implementing the Directive. "Back-end" methods of measurement, such as refuse hauling and waste sorts, are not the only means of measuring program success. Franklin Associates Ltd., which have for many years prepared waste composition analyses for the USEPA, base their analyses on "front-end" analysis methods (i.e., determining how many products were discarded based on the amounts purchased and how long they were used). Why weren't these methods utilized in this case, when "back-end" methods failed?
24. Intro 482, which would make the Mayoral Directive and city agency environmental procurement a local law, has been opposed by the City Administration. Why isn't support and passage of this legislation not included as part of the Plan and evaluated in the DEIS?
25. The City has a Waste Prevention Partnership with Business. Where there were local successes and documented waste prevention and dollar savings (page 91), why has the City not seized upon these and proposed to expand each of these citywide as part of its Plan milestones? Why are these not evaluated in the DEIS?
26. Where is the "Materials Exchange Research Report". Why isn't it appended to the Plan? How is the "cost per ton for the Department's investment in the program" calculated? (Page 83) Do the benefits of the Materials Exchange program in this calculation include the avoided costs and revenues to businesses? If not, these should be on the "benefits" side of the ledger. Is NY Wa$steMatch operating Citywide or just in Long Island City? If it is a successful program, as it appears to be, why aren't there Plan milestones to expand the program to cover the entire City?
27. The same can be said of Materials for the Arts and Materials for the Schools. Based on the tonnage of reusable products received by Materials for the Arts, 500 tons, and the value or replacement value to the organizations that receive them (including City government agencies), the benefit per ton of the program just to the recipient nonprofits, government, and art organizations range from $6,000 to $10,000 per ton. While no information is provided about the cost per ton of the program, or of the savings per ton in avoided collection and disposal costs, it appears that just from an economic point of view, Materials for the Arts should become a citywide program, and that milestones to expand it should appear in the Plan. Why has this not been done?
28. The Plan mentions that an EPA-funded roundtable on packaging held in late 1998 (page 89) recommended a number of legislative proposals. What has the City done to implement these proposals (including staff time), and what has been the result of these efforts? Where are the Roundtable findings that were supposedly "appended to the report"? Why aren't these recommendations included as milestones in the Plan or evaluated in the DEIS?
29. How does the study "Packaging Legislation Research Report" (page 89) cover the topics: manufacturer responsibility legislation, shared responsibility and advance disposal fees, which typically pertain to durable products and/or toxic and/or disposable products? Where is this report and where is the research to cover these other topics? Why aren't the recommendations from this report, and development and support for these legislative topics, included as milestones in the Plan and evaluated in the DEIS?
30. Local legislation to reduce the toxicity of products and packaging (and therefore, waste) is lacking. Why doesn't DOS have a Plan to develop, in cooperation with Council and the Solid Waste Advisory community, bills on the following: (1) requiring all retailers of household and automotive batteries to accept batteries, providing rebates to consumers; as well as requiring that retailers charge a meaningful deposit on the sale of all household and automotive batteries, (2) requiring that DGS and city agencies purchase less toxic or nontoxic products and packaging where currently such alternatives are available. ("Toxic" includes heavy metals, solvents, pesticides, and other pollutant precursors.), and (3) requiring retailers selling hazardous household products to pay a permit fee (as well as comply with mandatory shelf labeling requirements and to disseminate information on Household Hazardous Waste).
31. In every Solid Waste Management Plan, the City agrees to push for certain legislative initiatives to improve waste prevention, recycling and/or composting in the City. Some initiatives that should be considered for inclusion in the Plan and which should be evaluated in the FEIS are:

• Introduce local (or support state) legislation to extend the State’s bottle law to noncarbonated beverages, and to containers sold in restaurants or delis. 75% of unclaimed deposits and fines from these should be earmarked for a waste prevention research fund.
• Introduce local legislation to require products sold in NYC be labeled with (1) product-to-package ratio, (2) cost of packaging, (3) package recyclability in NYC residential recycling program, (4) toxics content of packaging (at a minimum chlorine, lead, cadmium, mercury), and (5) secondary and postconsumer content in packaging.
• Introduce local legislation to promote sale within New York City of products packaged with less or reusable packaging with more recycled content, greater recyclability, and less toxicity.
• Introduce local legislation to require products sold in NYC be labeled with (1) average lifespan of product, (2) product warrantee period, (3) toxics content of product (at a minimum chlorine, lead, cadmium, mercury), (4) secondary and postconsumer content in product, (5) product recyclability in NYC residential recycling program.
• Introduce local legislation, based on product-to-packaging research, to discourage sale of overly packaged products and to provide incentives for increasing recyclability, recycled content, refillability, reusability, or reduced volume or toxicity of packaging.
• Introduce local legislation to require that a DOS Bring Your Own Bag sign be affixed to each cash register, and to provide economic incentives to businesses which reduce and persons who acquire products which prevent waste (e.g., reusable products, products which consume fewer natural resources in their operation, and products which contain fewer toxic compounds).
• Introduce local legislation to permit the city government to impose quantity-based user fees for the collection of residential solid waste citywide.
• Introduce local legislation to require retailers to charge consumers a set fee for shopping bags and disposable eating utensils, cups, plates and napkins.
• Introduce local legislation to promote sale within New York City of more durable, repairable products, products with longer warrantees, and products which promote energy or water conservation, or other avenues of waste prevention.
• Introduce local legislation requiring that all retailers of motor oil be required to display a sign informing consumers where to bring used oil for recycling.
• Research Advance Disposal Fees (ADF) on products containing toxic constituents, and on disposable, nonrepairable, or nonserviceable products and multi-material (non-recyclable) products, and introduce local legislation instituting the ADF concept, to reduce generation of waste products containing toxic constituents and on disposable, nonrepairable, nonserviceable, and multi-material (non-recyclable) products, and packaging marketed in NYC.
• Introduce local legislation to provide economic incentives to refurbishers, second-hand, rental, cleaning, and repair stores (e.g., repeal sales taxes for these businesses); require stores to provide information on the quantity of waste prevented before/after the law is instituted.
• Introduce local legislation to ban the sale of plastic bottles and jugs which are not recyclable in NYC’s curbside program (e.g. PVC).
• Introduce local legislation to provide economic incentive to purchasers of durable equipment which is designed to promote the reduction in purchase / use of disposable products (e.g., commercial diaper / laundry service, double-sided copiers, printers)
• Introduce local legislation to require retailers to allocate a minimum amount of shelf-space for products packaged in refillable or packaging returnable for reuse.
• Introduce local legislation to require retailers to allocate a minimum amount of shelf space for products packaged in bulk.

1. The Plan alludes to completed research on building codes to increase use of recycled content building materials. Where is the "Inter-Agency Task Force Action Plan to Encourage the Use of Recycled-Content Building Materials"? Why isn't this "Action Plan" part of the Solid Waste Management Plan and evaluated in the DEIS?
2. The DOS and other agencies have for years implemented a number of pilot "Recycle a Bicycle" vocational education programs in City schools, for the purpose of educating students on the repair of bicycles, providing them and the community with repaired bicycles, and providing the students with a usable skill. The "Recycle a Bicycle" program is now nearly economically self-sufficient. The very few schools in which this program exists does not nearly satisfy the supply of bicycles that would otherwise become garbage and students who would want the training. Why doesn't the City Plan include citywide expansion of this successful program? Since this concept could easily be translated to vocational repair education of other valuable durable products (e.g., electronics, computers, furniture, and appliances), why does the City not include milestones in the Plan for pilots and eventual expansion of this larger program? Why aren't the environmental, economic, and social impacts of this program evaluated in the DEIS?
3. The success of waste prevention depends partly on innovative design and proper implementation (e.g., wide distribution) of a variety of educational and motivational programs, targeted to different types of people. What has the City done to research how to best approach educating the varied, and largely unenlightened public (with respect to waste prevention) in the residential sector, and why hasn't the City included any educational programs in the Plan or evaluated their impacts in the DEIS?
4. In order to assist residents in learning how to reduce waste generation, and to find ways to do it, the City should establish storefronts in each community board to provide a place for a permanent swap shop, household hazardous waste dropoff, prevention, recycling, and composting education center, repair and rentals referral center, and a place where durable products, repaired in the school-based vocational repair education programs (above), could be sold. The impacts of such a citywide program should be evaluated in the DEIS.
5. The Plan alludes to a Direct Mail Reduction program. What was the program cost and benefits? How many New Yorkers saw the displays in the public libraries or access the website?
6. Food waste constitutes at least 13%, and some say 15% of the residential waste stream. Yard waste adds another 3%. All these materials can be composted cleanly. A few composting programs are described. How much of the compostable fraction of the waste stream do the programs in the Plan target? Since most of the programs target the small yard waste stream, or are small pilot programs, why doesn't the City include a more ambitious program to target initiatives to compost a large fraction of the compostable stream by the end of the 10 year planning timeframe?
7. USEPA has for ten years reported an increasing number of municipalities, now numbering over 5,000 from large cities to small towns, that charge residents for garbage collection and management based on the quantity of garbage they put out for collection (Quantity-Based User Fees). EPA's 1994 report indicated that the average increase in diversion (waste prevention plus recycling) is 45% due solely to this billing method. The current Plan agrees that residential QBUFs would likely achieve "substantial and measurable reductions in waste" (page 86). An increasing, and we would argue, sufficient body of knowledge is available from these 5,000 municipalities regarding how to implement QBUFs and overcome/resolve most of the problems the City would face. In prior Solid Waste Management Plans, the City committed to implementing pilot research programs to locate and resolve, in advance of a full-scale program, any special problems involved with implementing QBUFs in the City. Since EPA and SERA research indicate that this is the single most effective means of increasing diversion/prevention, why doesn't the City include in its Plan a program to implement QBUFs, first by informing building owners of the real cost to them (currently paid in tax form) of waste services in this City, then by instituting pilots, then to implement QBUFs in all single-family residential areas, and then in all multi-family dwellings? Why aren't the impacts of instituting QBUFs evaluated in the DEIS?
8. Since the City forced HHC and other agencies to pay for their own waste management in the early 1990s, there has been an increased incentive for them to devise and implement methods of reducing the disposables and excessive packaging they purchase, to buy relatively more durable products, and to take better care of them for the long-term. Why has the City not pursued agency QBUFs or Quantity-Based User Incentives, to share savings gained as a result of waste prevention due to more enlightened (environmental) purchasing strategies, repair programs, sales/donation of unused durables, etc.? Why isn't this part of the Plan and evaluated in the DEIS?
9. The Plan mentions (page 88) that the Department of Sanitation has developed a Waste Prevention Action Plan to implement strategies, document the quantity of waste reduced, and estimate the cost savings. Why is this information not provided as an appendix? Other City Agency waste assessments were mentioned also. Where are these reports? Have the recommendations in these reports been implemented in all the agencies? What are the economic and environmental costs and benefits and why aren't these in the DEIS?
10. The City's last published waste composition study was finished in 1990, and was included in the original 1992 SWM Plan. In order to satisfy planning requirements for the current Solid Waste Management Plan, the City needs current information from which to design waste prevention, recycling, and composting initiatives for the next ten years. The 1990 study's 46-material sort was primarily materials, recyclables and compostable materials. In addition to potential recyclable materials, in order to intelligently design waste prevention programs, legislation, incentives and other initiatives, the City must also measure different durable and nondurable product categories, as well as packaging types. Why has the City not included such information in its Plan? The Plan clearly states that the findings were presented to the National Recycling Coalition Congress in 1997, while these were (and continue to be) withheld from the Citywide Recycling Advisory Board's Waste Prevention Committee, that helped generate the project design. The Plan alludes to a "Characterization of New York City's Solid Waste Stream" study (page 90). Where is this new study, and what has the City been doing with the new information for the last 3 years (i.e., why has it not been disseminated or included in the Plan)?
11. Products and packaging contain toxic, flammable, corrosive, and/or reactive ingredients. As long as this is the case, there will be waste having these properties. Though every effort should be made to reduce generation of Household Hazardous Waste, it should be of some interest that US EPA has signed a Universal Waste Rule that streamlines regulations for the generation, transport, treatment, storage and disposal of certain wastes (e.g. batteries, mercury-containing thermostats, and pesticides). By granting a conditional exemption from some RCRA Subtitle C requirements, the rule should encourage state and local governments and manufacturers to establish collection and recycling programs, and retailers to participate in them. (Household Hazardous Waste Management News, Vol VI, #25).
12. The City has a household hazardous waste pilot program in Staten Island that has been operating for several years. What have been the environmental and economic costs and benefits of this program? What are the City's environmental and economic justifications (costs AND benefits) for not implementing this program Citywide (including it in the Plan), and ultimately, in several Sanitation garages in each borough, and why is this analysis not in the DEIS?
13. By what means is the City proposing to increase the diversion rate for recyclable materials by 25% from 20% to 25% in order to satisfy the latest Court decision (litigation over Local Law 19 of 1989)?
14. Besides the pilot programs mentioned in the Plan, waste prevention projects in New York have shown that significant potential exists for reduction in waste volume and operating costs. The Council on the Environment of New York City (CENYC) has conducted pilot studies in waste prevention in fourteen organizations including City schools, colleges, government agencies, and various businesses. An average of 15% of the waste has already been reduced. The CENYC studies have provided effective strategies that are cost-effective for the organizations to implement. Waste volume, disposal labor, and carting costs are reduced. Greater still are the savings the organizations receive in strategic purchasing. The studies funded by the Department of Sanitation (DOS) and the State Department of Economic Development have resulted in significant waste reduction and should be applied to all institutions and government agencies being serviced by DOS. A guidance waste prevention manual for schools, government agencies, and organizations, written by CENYC and INFORM can be used by these sectors to implement waste reduction practices. Why aren't these sorts of strategies expanded Citywide as part of the Plan or evaluated in the DEIS?
15. Residential recycling in NYC removes no more than half, and perhaps no more than a third of the recyclables in the waste stream. The potential for increased recycling rates could be realized if homeowners AND BUILDING OWNERS understood that they are liable for serious fines if they refuse to recycle All designated recyclables. Why is this not included in the Plan or evaluated in the DEIS?

 

On page 19-41 of the DEIS, there is a reference to the incremental cost of recycling evaluation. The results of this evaluation suggests that recycling is more expensive than export, and therefore, recycling is not a cost-effective (partial) alternative to export. However, it appears that DOS’ has overestimated the incremental cost of recycling by a number of assumptions: no additional design capacity, a lower dollars per ton avoided cost of transportation and disposal, a lower avoided collection cost, and attributing additional administrative and outreach and education costs to recycling.

To understand the assumptions behind DOS’ estimate of the incremental cost (savings) of recycling:

16. Please provide a breakdown of the PS and OTPS budget costs that make up the $1,360,000 figure for Bureau of Waste Prevention, Reuse and Recycling (BWPRR) Administration. Is the total cost for BWPRR Administration costs reflect only for the curbside recycling collection program? If it includes programs other than curbside recycling, please name them along with the budget amounts for each program and explain why they are included.
17. Please provide a breakdown of the PS and OTPS budget costs that make up the $2,985,000 figure for Public Education and Outreach. Does this cost reflect only the curbside collection portion of the Public Education and Outreach budget. If it includes programs other than curbside recycling, please name them along with the budget amounts for each program and explain why there are included.

53. Why doesn’t the DEIS discuss how the 25% recycling rate will be achieved (as suggested by DEC’s comments dated April 23, 1999 and December 21, 1998 on the EIS Scoping Document)?
54. How can the DEIS assume a 25% recycling rate for build year FY 2002 (p.19-40), when there is no plan outlined (no milestones) for getting from the current recycling rate of 20% to an improved rate of 25%? Why is there no recycling plan or clearly defined milestones to increase the city’s recycling diversion rate? If DOS has a plan for moving from 20% to 25%, please provide details of the plan.

58. Why doesn’t the DEIS at least reference the proposed EPA regulations on diesel engines and diesel fuel, considering they are scheduled to be in effect shortly after the full implementation of the long-term export plan (within 2-3 years assuming a FY 2004 implementation date)?
59. Has DOS factored in the additional cost of complying with the proposed EPA regulations on diesel engines and diesel fuel?

Background: As stated on p. 23-64 on the DEIS, pollution emissions rates from diesel engines were estimated for each of the operations using emissions factors from EPA’s Non-road Engine Vehicle Emission Study Report (EPA-21A-2001, November 1991). The DEIS should evaluate pollution emission rates and air quality in light of the newly proposed EPA regulations on diesel, or at least reference the proposed regulations. The new proposed regulations governing emissions standards for diesel engines would be phased in between 2007 and 2010, and the proposal addressing diesel fuel could go into effect in June 2006. These proposed EPA regulations would directly influence the implementation and associated economic and environmental impacts of the DOS’ proposed long-term export plan. Implementation of these diesel regulations would cut nitrogen oxide emissions by 95%, soot by 90%, and sulfur emissions from 50 parts per million (ppm) to 15 ppm.

 

60. Why isn’t dioxin considered a pollutant of concern emitted by diesel-fueled vehicles in the DEIS (page 23-60)?

Background: Dioxin is known to be a pollutant emitted by diesel-fueled vehicles, and a human carcinogen. EPA has recently released a report on dioxin, which characterizes dioxin as a human carcinogen. This report can be found on EPA’s website: www.epa.gov/ncea/dioxin.htm.

61. The Solid Waste Management Plan modification has not evaluated any changes in truck emissions resulting from a reduced need for collections, transfers and exports resulting from implementation of significant waste prevention programs, nor effect on truck emissions of changes in waste sheds or optimization of recycling and waste collection routes to minimize truck travel time. Since truck emissions contain both criteria air pollutants, as well as hazardous air pollutants, the DEIS must evaluate feasible alternatives and include a health and environmental risk assessment of the proposed Plan as well as alternatives to the Plan which involve 10% waste prevention, 20% waste prevention, optimized truck routes, and optimized waste sheds.

Background: According to the California Air Resources Board (ARB), "emissions from diesel-fueled engines are composed of particulate matter and gases, which contain potential cancer-causing substances such as arsenic, benzene, formaldehyde, nickel, and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons. Emissions from diesel-fueled engines currently include over 40 substances that are listed by USEPA as hazardous air pollutants and by the ARB has toxic air pollutants… Research studies show that emissions from diesel-fueled engines may cause cancer in animals and humans. Studies show that workers exposed to higher levels of emissions from diesel-fueled engines are more likely to develop lung cancer. In 1990, in the State of California, under Proposition 65, identified diesel exhaust as a chemical known to cause cancer… The International Agency for Research on Cancer has concluded that diesel engine exhaust probably causes cancer in humans. (Source: California Air Resources Board's website: http://www.arb.ca.gov/toxics/dieseltac/dieseltac.htm, Fact Sheet: The Toxic Air Contaminant Identification Process: Toxic Air Contaminant Emissions from Diesel-fueled Engines Table 2 in the attached report shows that diesel exhaust to be more carcinogenic than vinyl chloride, benzene and asbestos!

USEPA has been looking into the toxic character of diesel emissions as well. Even in 1994, when the following was written, the carcinogenic effect of mobile emission sources was clear: "Motor vehicles emit several pollutants that EPA classifies as known or probable human carcinogens. Benzene, for instance, is a known human carcinogen, while formaldehyde, acetaldehyde, 1,3-butadiene and diesel particulate matter are probable human carcinogens. Studies are underway to determine whether other toxic substances are present in mobile source emissions. For example, EPA and industry are investigating whether oxygen-containing fuel additives such as methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) cause any adverse health effects. EPA is also working with the vehicle and fuel industries to test motor vehicle emissions for the presence of dioxin.

EPA estimates that mobile (car, truck, and bus) sources of air toxics account for as much as half of all cancers attributed to outdoor sources of air toxics. This estimate is not based on actual cancer cases, but on models that predict the maximum number of cancers that could be expected from current levels of exposure to mobile source emissions. The models consider available health studies, air quality data, and other information about the types of vehicles and fuels currently in use. Nonroad mobile sources (such as tractors and snowmobiles) emit air toxics as well." (Source: USEPA website: EPA 400-F-92-004, August 1994 Fact Sheet OMS-2

Since this was written EPA has moved against MBTE and has issued a report (June, 2000) determining the family of dioxins and furans, which the California Air Resources Board HAS FOUND in car and truck emissions, to be carcinogenic to humans.

 

Budget-related Questions:

Baseline years

There is considerable variation in the fiscal years and data sets used to provide baselines for overall costs and for pricing various components of the cost and alternatives.

62. Why does DOS feel that year 2002 is a better year for the analyses and comparisons in the DEIS and the SWMP rather than 2004 given that the interim plan will still be in effect in 2002 and the long-term plan would not be fully implemented until 2004?
63. In table 19.5-3 of the DEIS and table 4.3-2 of the SWMP (referenced on p. 19-41), how would using 2004 instead of 2002 affect the incremental costs of the proposed long-term export plan and the curbside recycling program?

Background: As discussed in sections 3.2 and 19.5 of the DEIS, FY 2002 is only relevant as the base year in that it is the year that Fresh Kills will close. The DEIS calls FY 2002 the build year, even though the interim plan will still be in effect in 2002. The only proposed facility that is scheduled to be operational by FY 2002 is the transfer facility on Staten Island. The Southwest Brooklyn transfer facility is scheduled to be operational in FY 2003, and the remaining proposed four facilities are not scheduled to be operational until 2004. The long-term export plan is not scheduled to be fully implemented until FY 2004.

64. On page 19-40 of the DEIS, FY 2002 is used to compare the interim plan to the long-term export plan. It states that "the economics are presented by comparing the total annual costs that the Dept. would anticipate incurring, assuming the full implementation…" Why? It would appear to make more sense to use FY 2004 as the reference point for the full implementation of the long-term export plan. By using FY 2002, it would appear that DOS underestimates the cost of both interim export plan and the cost of the long-term export plan. Each year, disposal costs and labor costs go up and therefore we would expect a baseline of FY 2004 would have cost more than a baseline of FY 2002. In addition, the costs of the interim plan will go up after FY 2002, as the Bronx contract will expire on July 2002 (considering the 2 one-year extensions) and therefore would need to be renegotiated.
65. Section 23.8 uses 1998 disposal costs. Have real (inflation-adjusted) disposal costs increased since 1998? If so, would using a current estimate of disposal costs increase the estimate of disposal in the long-term export plan?
66. Why does the DEIS use FY 1997 collection costs for estimating the cost of a fully implemented proposed long-term export plan?
67. Why is the capture rate (Table 19-4) based on adjusted 1990 Waste Composition Study data, instead of data contained in the Characterization of NYC Solid Waste Stream Study that was recently completed (according to the SWMP Draft Modification)?
68. Why is it that the City Administration requests only about $1 to $2 million for waste prevention, when it is the top priority in solid waste management according to State policy (Solid Waste Management Act)? Without sufficient funding, an ambitious program to achieve the State's 1997 goal cannot be achieved.

 

 

Borough self-sufficiency policy

Under borough self-sufficiency, would collection routes to the transfer facilities change compared to the routes in 1997, specifically:

69. Under the borough self-sufficiency policy, would sanitation trucks travel longer distances than in 1997?
70. Please list all instances (i.e. sanitation districts) where trucks would have to travel longer distances to get to a transfer facility in the same borough, than under the route scheme in 1997. For example, what is the difference in distance that a sanitation truck serving Far Rockaway in 1997 traveled compared to the proposed long-term export plan?

74. What is the incremental cost of borough self-sufficiency for trash collection, including relays?

77. Under the borough self-sufficiency policy, will sanitation trucks from one borough be allowed to travel through another borough to get to a transfer station?
78. If yes, then under the proposed plan is it possible that the trash from one borough might have a greater impact on another borough due to borough self-sufficiency policy? If so, please describe these scenarios and provide any analysis and/or evaluations of the impacts? For example, if trash from Far Rockaway is trucked through Brooklyn a greater distance to get to the Queens transfer facility, then if it went directly to the Hamilton Avenue facility in Brooklyn, there might be a greater environmental, social and economic to Brooklyn than if there was no borough self-sufficiency policy.
79. What is the incremental cost of having two facilities in the Greenpoint area (adjacent to Newtown Creek) – one in Queens and one in Brooklyn versus one facility serving the districts that were originally served by the Greenpoint MTS?
80. Does DOS know and has DOS evaluated the incremental costs and impacts (social, environmental and economic) of borough self-sufficiency compared to an alternative plan that does not require borough self-sufficiency? If yes, please provide detailed information on the costs and analyses.
81. Why weren’t these impacts (question 79) evaluated in the DEIS?
82. Does borough self-sufficiency, as discussed in the DEIS, also apply to waste once it is containerized at the transfer facilities proposed for Southwest Brooklyn and the facilities adjacent to the Newtown Creek in Queens and Brooklyn? If not, why and what is the difference in environmental, social and economic impacts between containerized and non-containerized waste coming into one borough from another?

Background: In the DEIS, DOS does not evaluate the incremental cost, or the economic, social and environment impacts of the borough self-sufficiency policy. There is a perception that this policy will reduce the impact in certain communities, but there is no information in the DEIS on the cumulative fiscal, environment or social impact on the city and its communities. It should be noted that borough self-sufficiency is not applied to commercial waste or recycling, or – directly related to the proposed long-term plan – to residential waste being tranported to a transfer facility or containerized residential waste that has left a transfer facility by barge or rail (i.e. containerized waste that might be sent via barge to the Howland Hook Marine Terminal in Staten Island).

Contingency planning and effect on cost of delays in implementation of the proposed long-term export plan.

83. What is the projected annual cost of the interim export plan if any (or all) of the contracts need to be extended beyond the second one year extension because of delays in operation of any of the facilities?
84. Would the contracts be renegotiated with the current vendors or would an RFP have to be issued if they need to extend beyond the second one-year extension?
85. What is DOS planning to do with the current Bronx interim contract since it will expire prior to FY 2004 when the Bronx transfer facility is scheduled to be operational? Including: Is DOS required to issue a new RFP? Will it renegotiate the interim contract with the current vendor? What is the projected cost of this new extended interim contract?
86. What is the annual incremental cost to the city for continuing the interim plan if the Linden EBUF is not operational by FY 2004?
87. What is the annual incremental cost to the city if the Bronx facility is not operational by FY 2004?
88. What is the annual incremental cost to the city if the Southwest Brooklyn MTS retrofit is not operational by 2003?
89. What is the annual incremental cost to the city if the Greenpoint Brooklyn facility is not operational by FY 2003?
90. What is the annual incremental cost to the city if the new Queens facility is not operational by FY 2004?
91. Does DOS have a contingency plan, other than continuing the interim export plan, should there be delay(s) in the operation of any of the proposed transfer and EBUF facilities?

• The Bronx interim waste export contract started in July 1997 and will therefore expire on July 2002. The Bronx transfer facility is not scheduled to begin facility operation until FY 2004.
• The Manhattan interim export contract was start in December 1999, and therefore will expire on December 2004. The Linden facility is scheduled to be completed by FY 2004. However, there is no guarantee that it will be ready by then.
• The Brooklyn interim contract started December 1998 with two one-year extensions. This contract will expire on December 2003. The Linden EBUF where this trash from Brooklyn is scheduled to be deposited if not scheduled to be operating until sometime in FY 2004.

93. Why doesn’t the DEIS evaluate the costs and benefits of siting the only proposed EBUF in Linden, NJ versus within the city boundaries? Please provide a cost/benefit analysis of siting the only proposed EBUF in Linden, NJ versus within the city boundaries, including factors such as site development and building costs, job creation, community host fees and other operating fees.
94. Why doesn’t the DEIS address the potential risks to the city of siting a facility that will be managing approximately 50% of the city’s residential waste stream (all of Manhattan, ½ of Brooklyn, 2/3 of Queens) without redundancy? What are the potential risks of siting such a facility within the regulatory authority of another state, namely New Jersey?

 

Commercial waste

95. Commercial recycling in NYC does not enjoy wide participation; why has the City not enforced commercial recycling, and why is this not part of Plan milestones for the future or evaluated in the DEIS?
96. Why doesn’t the DEIS evaluate the proposed plan’s impact on future handling of the city’s commercial waste?
97. How will the proposed plan impact the future of commercial waste handling.
98. Specifically, what steps will DOS take to ensure that the proposed plan and associated procurements will not discourage or preclude future increases in barge and rail-based export for commercial waste?
99. Does DOS plan to use procurements associated with the proposed long-term export plan to encourage the use of barge and rail-based export of commercial waste? Please explain.

1. NYC DOS Monthly Recycling Curbside & Containerized Total Diversion Reports
2. Monthly/Quarterly Recycling Diversion Reports for Commercial Transfer Stations
3. MTA Monthly Recycling Diversion Reports
4. Annual City Agency Waste Assessment Reports and Implementation Plans
5. DOS bureau of Planning and Budget (BPB) Mayor’s Management Report (MMR)
6. Monthly Trend Analysis Report
7. DOS BPB Recycling Report-Monthly Trend (monthly tons)
8. Tons per Day for Recycling Programs
9. Monthly Tons for Recycling Programs: FY 2000 Plan & FY 2001 Preliminary Plan
10. Five-Year Tonnage Plan
11. DOS Bureau of Waste Disposal (BWD) Loads and Tonnage Report

1. 1992 Comprehensive Solid Waste Management Plan (SWMP) Reports (including Appendices)
2. 1996 SWMP Modification
3. Summary of Findings from Waste Prevention Round Table held in November 1998
4. DEIS Scoping Document for the Modification to the SWMP and responses to public comments
5. 1990 Waste Composition Study
6. Evaluating New York City’s Waste Prevention Programs
7. Waste Prevention Research Report on Programs in Other Jurisdictions
8. NYCitySen$e Summary Report
9. Department of Sanitation Waste Prevention Action Plan
10. Procurement Policy Research Report
11. Packaging Legislation Research Report
12. Inter-Agency Task Force Action Plan to Encourage the Use of Recycled-Content Building Materials
13. Life Span Costing Analysis Case Studies
14. Characterization of New York City’s Solid Waste Stream
15. Materials Exchange Research Report
16. NYC WasteLe$$ Summary Report
17. NYC WasteLe$$ Institutionalization Plan
18. New Guide for City agencies on Direct Mail
19. New York City Recycles: More than a Decade of Public Education and Outreach by the NYC Department of Sanitation FY 86-99
20. How New Yorkers Think About Recycling: Market Research on Resident Attitudes and Behaviors, 1995-1999

21. NYCitySen$e Guide

• Preliminary citywide recycling plan (July 14, 1998)
• Updated preliminary citywide recycling plan for 1999 and 2000, including:
• 5-year strategy for collecting , processing and marketing and selling the designated recycling materials
• comprehensive and up-to-date lists of large-scale generators of recyclable materials
• a comprehensive analysis of all appropriate department properties and facilities to determine their feasibility as recycling centers;
• recommended revisions and an evaluation of the feasibility and effectiveness of such revisions to the building code of the City of New York, …
• proposals developed in consultation with the board of education…
• recommended product labelling requirements…
• a summary of outstanding recycling problems
• RFP to ensure processing capacity for all the recycable material which the City is required to collect pursuant to Section 16-305

May 27, 1998

Mr. John D. Dunlap, III

Chairman

Air Resources Board

2020 L Street

Sacramento, California 95814

Dear Chairman Dunlap:

I am pleased to forward to you the Scientific Review Panel’s (SRP/Panel) Findings (enclosure) for the Proposed Identification of Diesel Exhaust as a Toxic Air Contaminant Report as adopted unanimously at the Panel’s April 22, 1998 meeting.

The data, developed and reviewed by OEHHA and ARB, in the scientific risk assessment on exposure to diesel exhaust (Part A) and its health effects (Part B), are extensive and scientifically sound. The SRP notes the report documents the fact that diesel exhaust includes over 40 substances listed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency as hazardous air pollutants and by the ARB as toxic air contaminants.

The exposure estimate in the report may underestimate many Californians’ actual total exposure because it excludes elevated exposures near roadways, railroad tracks, and inside vehicles. Other routes of exposure to diesel exhaust, such as ingestion and dermal absorption are also excluded.

Development of this report began in 1989, and this compound has the most human epidemiological studies (over 30) than any of the previous 21 toxic air contaminant reports the Panel has reviewed. These studies have investigated the relationship between occupational diesel exhaust exposure and lung cancer, and the epidemiological evidence indicates exposure to diesel exhaust increases the risk of lung cancer. It is noted that in 1990 the State of California, pursuant to Proposition 65, identified diesel exhaust as a chemical "known to the State to cause cancer."

There are a number of adverse long-term noncancer effects associated with exposure to diesel exhaust. These effects include chronic bronchitis, inflammation of lung tissue, thickening of the alveolar walls, immunological allergic reactions, and airway constriction. As new quantitative data emerge from research on adverse noncancer effects from diesel exhaust, the Reference Exposure Level may require adjustment.

John D. Dunlap, III, Chairman

May 27, 1998

Page Two

The Panel believes there is still more to be learned about the adverse health effects associated with exposure to diesel exhaust. The Panel is concerned that some technological advances may result in greater total particulate exposure, particularly of fine particles that penetrate deeper into the lungs, but some controls and fuels may reduce overall particulate level. The Panel encourages further research to quantify the amounts of specific compounds emitted from a variety of engine technologies, operating cycles, and fuel to characterize better any differences between old and new fuels and technologies.

The Panel recognizes that diesel exhaust is a mixture of compounds and the potency factor may change as a result of new engine technologies and "cleaner" fuel. Accordingly, the unit risk factor may change as a result of new peer reviewed research.

We welcome any opportunity to provide additional information helpful to you or that would facilitate the process of identification.

We would appreciate our Findings and this transmittal letter being made a part of the final report.

Sincerely,

/s/

John R. Froines, Ph.D.

Acting Chairman

Scientific Review Panel

Enclosure

cc: Scientific Review Panel Members

Michael Kenny, ARB

Bill Lockett, ARB

Findings of the Scientific Review Panel on

as adopted at the Panel’s April 22, 1998, Meeting

Pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 39661, the Scientific Review Panel (SRP/Panel) has reviewed the report Proposed Identification of Diesel Exhaust as a Toxic Air Contaminant by the staffs of the California Air Resources Board (ARB or Board) and the Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA) describing the public exposure to, and health effects of, diesel exhaust. The Panel members also reviewed the public comments received on this report.

Panel members participated in workshops devoted to discussion of the exposure and health issues associated with diesel exhaust in September 1994, January 1996, July 1997, and March 1998. The SRP reviewed the issues at its meetings in October 1997 and April 1998. A special meeting of the SRP was held on March 11, 1998, to hear testimony on health issues including the quantitative risk assessment from highly respected scientists invited by the Panel. Based on these reviews and information provided at scientific workshops and meetings, the SRP makes the following findings pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 39661:

For these reasons, we agree with the science presented in Part A by ARB and Part B by OEHHA in the report on diesel exhaust and the ARB staff recommendation to its Board that diesel exhaust be listed by the ARB as a Toxic Air Contaminant.

/s/

John R. Froines, Ph.D

Acting Chairman,

Scientific Review Panel

µg/m³: microgram per cubic meter

µg/m³: microgram per cubic meter

a) Bolded values are included in OEHHA’s range of risk.

b) Obtained by applying Harris’ slope of 5 x 10^-4 (µg/m³ x yr)^-1 to California life table.